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ABSTRACT
In this paper I use a broad multi-country data set to analyze the relationship between restrictions to
capital mobility and external crises. The analysis focuses on two manifestations of external crises:
(a) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (b) current account reversals. I deal with two important
policy-related  issues:  First,  does  the  extent  of  capital  mobility  affect  countries’  degree  of
vulnerability to external crises; and second, does the extent of capital mobility determine the depth
of external crises  ￿ as measured by the decline in growth – once the crises occur? Overall, my
results cast some doubts on the assertion that increased capital mobility has caused heightened
macroeconomic vulnerabilities. I find no systematic evidence suggesting that countries with higher
capital mobility tend to have a higher incidence of crises, or tend to face a higher probability of
having a crisis, than countries with lower mobility. My results do suggest, however, that once a crisis
occurs, countries with higher capital mobility may face a higher cost, in terms of growth decline.
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I.  Introduction 
 
During the last few years a number of authors have argued that free capital 
mobility produces macroeconomic instability and contributes to financial vulnerability in 
the emerging nations.  For example, in his critique of the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, 
Stiglitz (2002) has argued that pressuring emerging and transition countries to relax 
controls on capital mobility during the 1990s was huge mistake.  According to him, the 
easing of controls on capital mobility was at the center of most (if not all) of currency 
crises in the emerging markets during the last decade -- Mexico 1994, East Asia 1997, 
Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey 2001, and Argentina 2002. These days, even the IMF 
seems to criticize free capital mobility and to provide (at least some) support for capital 
controls.  Indeed, in a visit to Malaysia in September 2003 Horst Koehler, then the 
Fund’s Managing Director, praised the policies of Prime Minister Mahatir, and in 
particular his use of capital controls in the aftermath of the 1997 currency crisis 
(Financial Times, September 15
th, 2003; page 16).  
  Supporters of capital controls have argued that restricting capital mobility has two 
important potential benefits:  (a) It reduces a country’s vulnerability to external shocks 
and financial crises; and (b) it allows countries that have suffered a currency crisis to 
lower interest rates, implement pro-growth policies, and emerge out of the crisis sooner 
than what they would have done it otherwise.  According to this view, controlling capital 
outflows would give crises countries additional time to restructure their financial sector in 
an orderly fashion.
1   
  The evidence in support of these claims, however, has been mostly country 
specific, and not particularly convincing.  Some authors have claimed that by restricting 
capital mobility Chile was able to avoid the type of macroeconomic turmoil that affected 
the rest of Latin America during the 1990s (Stiglitz 1999).
2  Also, it has been argued that 
Malaysia’s imposition of controls on capital outflows in the aftermath of the Asian debt 
                                                            
1 Most well-trained economists would agree that there are trade-offs associated with the imposition of 
capital controls.  Whether the costs offset the benefits is a complex empirical question, whose answer will 
depend on the specificities of each particular country.  Doing a full-blown cost-benefit analysis is well 
beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
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crisis helped the country rebound quickly, and resume a growth path (Kaplan and Rodrik, 
2002).  According to other authors, however, the experiences of both Chile and Malaysia 
with capital controls have been mixed at best (Dornbusch 2002, Johnson and Mitton 
2001, De Gregorio et. al. 2000).  What is particularly interesting about this debate is that 
after many years it continues to be mostly centered on the experiences of a handful of 
countries, and that much of it has taken place at an anecdotal level.  There have been very 
few studies that have provided multi-country evidence on whether capital controls indeed 
reduce vulnerability, and/or reduce the costs of crises.
3  This paucity of multi-country 
studies is partially explained by the difficulties in measuring the degree of capital 
mobility across time and countries (Eichengreen 2001). 
In this paper I use a broad multi-country data set to analyze the relationship 
between restrictions to capital mobility and external crises.  The analysis focuses on two 
manifestations of external crises that have received considerable attention during the last 
few years:  (a) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (b) current account reversals.
4  I am 
particularly interested in dealing with the following two specific questions:   
 
·  Do capital controls reduce the probability of a major external crisis 
(defined as a sudden stop or a current account reversal)?   
·  And, once a crisis has occurred, do countries that restrict capital mobility 
incur in lower costs – measured by reductions in growth -- than countries 
that have a more open capital account?   
 
In analyzing these issues I rely on two complementary approaches: First, I use a 
methodology based on the computation of non-parametric tests and frequency tables to 
analyze the incidence and main characteristics of both sudden stops and current account 
reversals in countries with different degrees of capital controls.  And second, I use a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See, however, De Gregorio et al (2000).  Some authors have also argued that the absence of crises in India 
and China is an indication of the merits of controlling capital mobility.  It is difficult, however, to take 
these claims seriously. 
3 There have been, however, a number of cross-country studies that have tried to determine whether capital 
controls have an effect on economic growth.  For a survey, see Eichengreen (2001). 
4 For a discussion on these two phenomena see, for example, Calvo et. al. (2004) and Edwards (2004a).   3/3/2005  3 
regression-based analysis that estimates jointly the probability of having a crisis, and the 
cost of such crisis, in terms of short-term declines in output growth.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II I provide a selected 
survey of recent efforts to measure the degree of capital mobility.  I review various 
indexes, and I discuss their strengths and weaknesses.  In Section III I deal with the 
evolution of capital account restrictions during the last thirty years.  The section opens 
with an analysis on the evolution of capital account openness based on a new index, 
which I have constructed by combining three data sources: (1) The index developed by 
Quinn (2003); (b) the index by Mody and Murshid (2002); and (c) country-specific 
information obtained from various sources, including country-specific sources.  Section 
IV deals with the anatomy of sudden stops and current account reversals. I analyze their 
incidence, and the extent to which these two phenomena are related.  This analysis is 
performed for three groups of countries classified according to the degree of capital 
mobility: “low capital mobility,” “intermediate capital mobility” and “high capital 
mobility” countries.  My main interest in this analysis is to compare the two extreme 
groups:  low and high capital mobility.  In Section V I report new results on the costs of 
external crises characterized by sudden stops and/or current account reversals.  I am 
particularly interested in determining if the cost of a crisis – measured in terms of lower 
growth – is different for countries with different degrees of capital mobility.  I use 
treatment regressions to analyze whether restricting capital mobility reduces 
vulnerability and the costs of crises.   Finally, in Section VI I provide some concluding 
remarks. The paper also has a data appendix. 
Before proceeding it is important to stress that in this paper I do not provide a 
full-fledge cost-benefit analysis of capital controls.  I deal in detail with two important 
aspects of the problem – capital controls and vulnerability, and the growth consequences 
of crises under different intensity of controls --, but I don’t cover all the consequences of 
control policies.  In particular, I don’t deal with many microeconomic consequences and 
costs of a policy of capital controls (see Forbes 2003, for this type of discussion).  
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II.  Measuring the Degree of Openness of the Capital Account 
Most analysts agree that during the last few decades there has been an increase in 
the degree of international capital mobility.  There is less agreement, however, on the 
exact nature (and magnitude) of this phenomenon.  The reason for this is that it is very 
difficult to measure in a relatively precise way a country’s degree of capital mobility.  
Indeed, with the exception of the two extremes – absolute freedom or complete closeness 
of the capital account --, it is not easy to provide effective measures that capture the 
extent of capital market integration.  What has been particularly challenging has been 
constructing indexes that allow for useful comparisons across countries and across time.  
In this section I review a number of attempts at building indexes of capital mobility, and I 
propose a new measure that combines information from two of the better indexes with 
country specific data.  I then use this new index to analyze the evolution of capital 
account restrictions during the last three decades. 
  Historically, most emerging and transition countries have relied heavily on 
different forms of capital account restrictions.  While throughout most of the post World 
War II period these have been aimed at avoiding capital “flight”, more recently countries 
have tried to avoid (or at least slow down) large inflows of capital (Edwards 1999).  
However, there has long been recognition that legal impediments on capital mobility are 
not always translated into actual restrictions on these movements.  This distinction 
between actual and legal capital mobility has been the subject of policy debates, 
including the debate on the effectiveness of capital controls.   
  There is ample historical evidence suggesting that there have been significant 
discrepancies between the legal and the actual degree of capital controls.  In countries with 
severe legal impediments to capital mobility -- including countries that have banned capital 
movement --, the private sector has traditionally resorted to the overinvoicing of imports and 
underinvoicing of exports to sidestep legal controls on capital flows (Garber 1998 discusses 
more sophisticated mechanisms).  For example, the massive volumes of capital flight that 
took place in Latin America in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis clearly showed that, when 
faced with the “appropriate” incentives, the public can be extremely creative in finding ways 
to move capital internationally.   The question of how to measure, from an economic point 
of view, the degree of capital mobility and the extent to which domestic capital markets are 3/3/2005  5 
integrated to the world capital market continue to be the subject of extensive debate (See 
Dooley, Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez 1997, for an early and comprehensive treatment of the 
subject.  See Eichengreen 2001, for a more recent discussion). 
  In two early studies Harberger (1978, 1980) argued that the effective degree of 
integration of capital markets should be measured by the convergence of private rates of 
return to capital across countries.  In trying to measure the effective degree of capital 
mobility, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) analyzed the behavior of savings and investments in 
a number of countries.  They argue that if there is perfect capital mobility, changes in 
savings and investments will be uncorrelated in a specific country.  That is, in a world 
without capital restrictions an increase in domestic savings will tend to "leave the home 
country", moving to the rest of the world.  Likewise, if international capital markets are fully 
integrated, increases in domestic investment will tend to be funded by the world at large and 
not necessarily by domestic savings.  Using a data set for 16 OECD countries Feldstein and 
Horioka found that savings and investment ratios were highly positively correlated, and 
concluded that these results strongly supported the  presumption that long term capital was 
subject to significant impediments.  Frankel (1991) applied the Feldstein-Horioka test to a 
large number of countries during the 1980s, including a number of Latin American nations.  
His results corroborated those obtained by the original study, indicating that savings and 
investment have been significantly positively correlated in most countries.   In a 
comprehensive analysis on the degree of capital Montiel (1994) estimated a series of 
Feldstein-Harioka equations for 62 developing countries.  Using the estimated regression 
coefficient for the industrial countries as a benchmark he concluded that the majority of the 
Latin American nations exhibited a relatively high degree of capital mobility – indeed much 
larger than what an analysis of legal restrictions would suggest.  
  In a series of studies Edwards (1985, 1988) and Edwards and Khan (1985) argued 
that degree of convergence of domestic and international interest rates could be used to 
assess the degree of openness of the capital account  (see also Montiel 1994).  The 
application of this model to the cases of a number of countries (Brazil, Colombia, Chile) 
confirms the results that, in general, the actual degree of capital mobility is greater than what 
the legal restrictions approach suggests. Haque and Montiel (1991), Reisen and Yeches 
(1993) and Dooley (1995) have provided expansions of this model that allow for the 3/3/2005  6 
estimation of the degree of capital mobility even in cases when there are not enough data on 
domestic interest rates, and when there are changes in the degree of capital mobility through 
time.   Their results once again indicate that in most emerging countries “true” capital 
mobility has historically exceeded “legal” extent of capital mobility.  Dooley et al (1997) 
developed a method for measuring the changes in the degree of capital mobility in emerging 
countries that recognizes the costs of undertaking disguised capital inflows.  The model is 
estimated using a Kalman filter technique for three countries.  The results suggest that all 
three countries experienced a very significant increase in the degree of capital mobility 
between 1977 and 1989.   Edwards (2000a) used a “time-varying coefficients” variant of 
this approach to analyze the way in which Chile’s actual degree of capital mobility evolved 
through time. 
  Some authors have used information contained in the International Monetary Fund’s 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to construct indexes on capital controls 
for a panel of countries.  Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferreti (1994), for example, constructed 
a dummy variable index of capital controls.  This indicator -- which takes a value of one 
when capital controls are in place and zero otherwise -- was then used to analyze some of 
the political forces behind the imposition of capital restrictions in a score of countries.
5  
Rodrik (1998) used similar index to investigate the effects of capital controls on growth, 
inflation and investment between 1979 and 1989.  His results suggest that, after controlling 
for other variables, capital restrictions have no significant effects on macroeconomic 
performance.  Klein and Olivei (1999) used the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions data to construct an index of capital mobility.  The index is defined as 
the number of years in the period 1986 and 1995 that, according to the IMF, the country in 
question has had an open capital account.
 6  In contrast to Rodrik, their analysis suggests that 
countries with a more open capital account have performed better than those that restrict 
capital mobility.
7  Milner (1996), Leblang (1997), Razin and Rose (1994) and Chinn and 
                                                            
5   Edison et al (2002) provide a very useful summary (Table 1 of their paper) of 12 different measures of 
capital account restrictions used in recent studies on the relation between capital controls and economic 
performance.   
6   A limitation with this indicator is that it dos not say if the index’s number (i.e. the percentage of years 
with restrictions) refers to most recent or most distant years in the time window being considered. 
7 As Eichengreen (2001) points out, some authors supplement the information form the IMF’s Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions with information on the extent of restrictions on current 
transactions.  See also Frankel (1992). 3/3/2005  7 
Ito (2002) have also used indicators based on the IMF binary classification of openness.  
The standard approach is to use line E.2 of the annual summary published in the Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  In an early attempt to use 
this IMF report, Edwards (1989) used the detailed information in the individual country 
pages to analyze the way in which restrictions on capital mobility changed in the period 
immediately surrounding a major exchange rate crisis. 
  A major limitation of these IMF-based binary indexes, however, is that they are 
extremely general and do not distinguish between different intensities of capital restrictions.  
Moreover, they fail to distinguish between the type of flow that is being restricted, and they 
ignore the fact that, as discussed above, legal restrictions are frequently circumvented.  For 
example, according to this IMF-based indicator, Chile, Mexico and Brazil were subject to 
the same degree of capital controls in 1992-1994.  In reality, however, the three cases were 
extremely different.  While in Chile there were restrictions on short-term inflows, Mexico 
had (for all practical purposes) free capital mobility, and Brazil had in place an arcane array 
of restrictions.  Montiel and Reinhart (1999) have combined IMF and country-specific 
information to construct an index on the intensity of capital controls in 15 countries during 
1990-96.  Although their index, which can take three values (0, 1 or 2) represent an 
improvement over straight IMF indicators, it is still rather general, and does not capture the 
subtleties of actual capital restrictions.   These measurement difficulties are not unique to 
the capital flows literature, however.  In fact, as Rodrik (1995) and Edwards (1998) have 
argued, the literature on trade openness and growth has long been affected by serious 
measurement problems.   
  In an effort to deal with these measurement problems, Quinn (1997) constructed a 
comprehensive set of cross country indicators on the degree of capital mobility.  His 
indicators cover 20 advanced countries and 45 emerging economies.  These indexes have 
two distinct advantages over other indicators:  First, they are not restricted to a binary 
classification, where countries capital accounts are either open or closed.  Quinn uses a 0 
through 4 scale to classify the countries in his sample, with a higher number meaning a 
more open capital account.  Second, Quinn indexes cover more than one time period, 
allowing researchers to investigate whether there is a connection between capital account 
liberalization and economic performance.  This is, indeed, an improvement over 3/3/2005  8 
traditional indexes that have concentrated on a particular period in time, without allowing 
researchers to analyze whether countries that open-up to international capital movements 
have experienced changes in performance.
8 In an interesting exercise, Edison et al (2002) 
compared Quinn’s (1997) index with an index based on the number of years that, 
according to the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, a country has had a 
closed capital account.  They found that for most (but not all) countries and period there 
was a correspondence between the two indicators. 
Chinn and Ito (2002) built a new index based on the IMF binary data.  Their index 
is the average of the first standardized principal component of each of four categories of 
transactions considered by the Fund.  Chinn and Ito consider their index to be in the spirit 
of the work by Edwards (2001) and Klein and Olivei (2001), and argue that, in contrast 
with the simple 0-1 IMF-based indexes, they are able to capture the intensity of capital 
restrictions.  An advantage of this index constructed by Chinn and Ito is that it is 
available for 105 countries for the period 1977-1997. 
More recently Quinn and Toyoda (2003) and Quinn (2003) used detailed data 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund to develop a new index of capital 
mobility for 59 countries.  This index goes from 1 to 100, with higher values denoting a 
higher degree of financial integration.  Thus, countries with stricter capital controls have 
a lower value of this index.   For a small number of these countries the index is available 
for the period 1950-1999; for most of them it is available for five years:  1959, 1973, 
1982, 1988 and 1997.  And, for a core number of countries the index is available since 
1890 (for details see Quinn 2003). Mody and Murshid (2002) also used IMF data as the 
bases for their index of financial integration.  This index covers 150 countries for (most 
of) the period 1966-2000, and is tabulated from a value of zero to four. This index takes 
the value of zero in case that a country has a closed capital account, closed current 
account, places restrictions in their exports receipts, and operates under multiple 
exchange rates.  Both these new indexes (Quinn and Mody-Murshid) represent a 
significant improvement over previous attempts at measuring the variation across time 
and countries of capital restrictions.   
                                                            
8 Note, however, that the basis information used by Quinn to construct this index also comes from the 
IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 3/3/2005  9 
In a recent paper Miniane (2004) has proposed a new measure based on detailed 
country-specific data compiler by the IMF.  Since 1996 the Fund’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, has published a very detailed 
and disaggregated index of capital account restrictions that distinguishes between 13 
different categories.  This level of disaggregation is a marked improvement over the pre-
1996 Annual Report data, which considered only six categories -- bilateral payments 
arrangements, restrictions on current account transaction payments, restrictions on capital 
account restrictions, import surcharges, advanced deposits on imports, and export 
proceeds surrending. Miniane has extended the more detailed 13-categories index 
backward to 1983 for 34 countries.  He shows that this new measure is more accurate 
than the older less detailed one.   
Although these new indexes on capital restrictions represent a major improvement 
with respect to earlier indicators, they still have some limitations, including the fact that 
in spite of the authors’ efforts, the indexes do not distinguish sharply between different 
types of restrictions (i.e. controls on FDI vs. portfolio flows; controls on inflows vs. 
controls on outflows).
9  Second, these indexes tend to blur the distinction between 
exchange restrictions -- including the required surrendering of exports’ proceeds -- and 
capital account restrictions.  Third, they do not deal in a systematic way with the fact that 
many countries controls are (partially) evaded.  This means that an ideal index of capital 
account restrictions would make a correction for the “effectiveness” of the controls (see 
De Gregorio et. al 2000 for an attempt to deal with this issue for the case of Chile).  
  Most of the indexes discussed above have tried to capture the overall degree of 
capital mobility in particular countries at a particular moment in time.  A number of 
authors, however, have concentrated on the degree of openness of the stock market.  
Most of these studies have tried to analyze the effect of the opening of the stock market 
on several macroeconomic and microeconomic variables.  For this reason, these studies 
make a significant effort to date correctly different liberalization efforts.  Early and 
ambitious efforts along these lines were made by Bekaert (1995), Bekaert and Harvey 
                                                            
9  The Quinn (1997) index considers separately capital account receipts and payments.  Johnston and 
Tamirisa (1998) is one of the few papers where an attempt is made to distinguish between controls on 
capital inflows and on various types of outflows.  Their index, however, covers only one year.  For related 
work see Tamirisa (1999). 3/3/2005  10 
(1995, 2000), and Bekaert et al (2002).  An important point made by these authors is that 
using the “official” or “legislative” dates of stock market liberalization may be highly 
misleading.  For this reason, the authors use data on actual net capital flows to date stock 
market liberalization episodes in a score of countries.  More specifically, they argue that 
liberalization episodes may be date by identifying breakpoints in the net capital flows 
data.
10  In a recent study, Edison and Warnock (2002) have used data on stock markets 
compiled by the International Finance Corporation to construct a new index of 
restrictions on ownership of stock by foreigners.  This index – which was constructed for 
29 countries – has a high degree of correlation with the index by Bekaert et al (2002).
11  
Shatz (2000) has built an index on capital account restrictions on the bases of restrictions 
on foreign direct investment in 57 countries.  This index has been used by Desai et al 
(2004) in a study on the way in which multinational firms deal with capital controls. 
  The selective survey presented in this subsection vividly captures the difficulties 
that researchers have encountered in their efforts to measure the degree of capital 
mobility of particular countries at particular points in time.  It also shows that this is a 
rapidly moving area of research, which is likely to continue to evolve in the future.  Most 
recent efforts to improve measurement have focused on moving away from coarse 
“closed-open” binary indexes, and have dealt with two issues:  (a) capturing the fact that 
when it comes to controls there are “grey areas,” and that there are gradations of 
restrictions; and (b) allowing comparisons of the intensity of controls across countries 
and time.  In both of these areas there have been considerable improvements in the last 
few years. 
 
III.  The Evolution of Capital Mobility in the World Economy: 1970-2001 
In this section I analyze the evolution of capital mobility in a large number of 
countries – both advanced and emerging – during the last three decades.  The first step is 
to discuss a new index on capital mobility; I then provide evidence of the extent to which 
countries have liberalized their capital account in the last ten years.   
 
                                                            
10 See also Henry (2000). 
11 See Edison et. al (2002) for a survey of studies on the effect of capital account restrictions on stock 
markets. 3/3/2005  11 
III.1  A New Index of Capital Mobility 
  In order to analyze the evolution of capital account restrictions I constructed a 
new index on capital mobility that combines information from Quinn (2003) and Mody 
and Murshid (2002), with information from country-specific sources.  In creating this 
new index a three steps procedure was followed:  First, the scales of the Quinn and Mody 
and Murshid indexes were made compatible.  The new index has a scale from 0 to 100, 
where higher numbers denote a higher degree of capital mobility; a score of 100 denotes 
absolutely free capital mobility.  Second, I use Stata’s “impute” procedure to deal with 
missing observations in the new index.  In order to impute preliminary values to the 
missing observations we use data on the two original indexes (Quinn and Mody and 
Murshid), their lagged values, openness as measured by import tariffs collections over 
imports, the extent of trade openness measured as imports plus exports over GDP, and 
GDP per capita.
12  In the third step, I use country-specific data to revise and refine the 
preliminary data created using the “impute” procedure discussed above.  The new index 
covers the period 1970-2000, and has data for 163 countries (although not every country 
has data for every year).  It is important to note that although this new index is a clear 
improvement over alternative indexes, it still has some shortcomings, including the fact 
that it does not distinguish very sharply between restrictions on capital inflows and 
restrictions on capital outflows.
13 
  In Figure 1 I present the evolution of the new index for six groups of countries:  
(1) Industrial; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) Asia; (4) Africa; (5) Middle East 
and North Africa; and (6) Eastern Europe.  This figure clearly captures the fact that the 
degree of capital mobility has increased in every one of these six regions during the last 
three decades.  A comparison of the 1970-1989 and the 1990-2000 period suggests that, 
on average, the industrial countries made the most progress in moving towards greater 
capital mobility; their average index went from 66.5 to 88.8.  The Middle East and North 
African countries, on the other hand, experienced only moderate capital account 
liberalization.  Their capital mobility index went from an average of 41.3 to 49.1.  Figure 
                                                            
12 See Aizenman and Noy (2004) on the relationship between trade account openness and capital account 
openness. 
13  See the discussion in the preceding section for an analysis of the shortcomings of different indexes.  See 
also Eichengreen (2001) and Edwards (1999). 3/3/2005  12 
1 also shows that this process of financial openness has followed different patterns in the 
different regions.  For instance, in the industrial countries it has been a relatively smooth 
process; in the Latin American countries, on the other hand, it is possible to see stricter 
capital account restrictions during the 1970s and 1980s, with an increase in the extent of 
capital mobility in the 1990s.  In Asia, there was an increase in capital mobility during 
the early 1990s, followed by a somewhat abrupt imposition of controls after the 1997 
crises.  Since then, capital mobility has increased somewhat.  Not surprisingly, Eastern 
Europe is the region that has experienced the greatest discrete jump in the degree of 
capital mobility. 
  As a way of gaining further insights into the evolution of capital mobility during 
the period 1970-2001, I used data on the new index on capital mobility to divide the 
sample into three equal-size groups depending on the extent of mobility.  These groups 
have been labeled High, Intermediate and Low mobility.
14  This three-way division of the 
sample clearly captures the fact that the degree of capital mobility has increased 
significantly during the last thirty years.  In 1970, 44% of the observations corresponded 
to Low mobility; 26% to Intermediate; and 30% to High mobility.  In the year 2000, in 
contrast, 24% of the observations corresponded to Low mobility; 25% to Intermediate; 
and 52% to High mobility.  Table 1 contains summary data on the index of capital 
mobility for the Low and High mobility groups.
15  As may be seen, the mean and median 
values of the index are very different across groups.  Indeed a test with the equality of 
means indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at a high degree of confidence (t-
statistic = 136.9).   
In order to illustrate which type of country belongs to each group, in Table 2 I 
present a list of a subset nations with High and Low capital mobility.  These subsets focus 
on the “extremes” of the distributions, and capture countries with Very High mobility 
(index value equal or higher than 87.5) and Very Low mobility (index value lower or 
                                                            
14   Since the unit of analysis is a country/year observation, and there has been a trend towards higher 
capital mobility (see Figure 1), most observations in the High mobility group correspond to recent 
country/year observations.  Likewise, by construction most (but by no means all) observations in the Low 
mobility group correspond to early (1970s and 1980s) country/year observations.   
15   In much (but not all) of the analysis that follows I will deal only with the Low and High restrictions 
groups.  That is, in many of the results that follow the group of countries with Intermediate restrictions has 
been dropped.   3/3/2005  13 
equal to 12.5).
16  As may be seen, while the number of countries with Very High capital 
mobility increased from decade to decade, the number with Very Low mobility declined, 
until in the 1990-2000 decade there were no nations with an index value below 12.5.   
Finally, in Table 3 I present a list of countries that during a five year period 
experienced major changes in the extent of capital mobility:  Panel A in Table 3 lists 
countries that moved from High to Low mobility.  As may be seen, there are relatively 
few nations that went through a rapid and extreme closing of the capital account. 
Interestingly, all cases correspond to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
took place during the first half of the 1980s when the region was going through the debt 
crisis.  In Panel B of Table 3 I have listed countries that have gone through rapid capital 
account liberalizations – these are countries that within five years have gone from Low 
mobility all the way to High capital mobility -- skipping, as it were, the adolescence stage 
of capital mobility.  As may be seen, during the 1980s one emerging country (Uruguay) 
and three OECD countries went through– Australia, Norway and Portugal -- this rapid 
liberalization process.  In contrast, during the 1990s an increasingly large number of 
emerging countries – including many in Latin America and Africa – liberalized their 
capital accounts rapidly. 
 
IV.  The Anatomy of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops:  Is there a 
Difference between High and Low Capital Mobility Countries? 
  Recent discussions on external crises have tended to focus on two related 
phenomena: (1) sudden stops of capital inflows, defined as a situation where the flow of 
capital coming into a country is reduced significantly in a very short period of time; and 
(2) current account reversals, or major reductions in the current account deficit that take 
place within a year or two.
17  In this section I analyze these two phenomena during the 
last thirty years, and I rely on nonparametric tests to investigate whether their incidence 
                                                            
16  These break-points were selected in an arbitrary fashion. 
17 The term “sudden stops” was introduced by Rudi Dornbusch and has been popularized by Guillermo 
Calvo and his associates.  On sudden stops see, for example, Calvo et. al. (2004), and Edwards (2004a, b).  
On current account reversals see Milesi- Ferreti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2002, 2004a,b) and Guidotti 
et.al. (2004).  See Taylor (2002) for a fascinating discussion on long term trends in current account 
dynamics.  On the long term interplay between capital flows and the current account, see Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2004). 3/3/2005  14 
and main characteristics have been different for countries with High capital mobility, and 
countries with Low mobility. 
IV.1  Incidence of Sudden Stops and Reversals 
  In this paper I have defined a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major 
reduction in capital inflows to a country that up to that time had been receiving large 
volumes of foreign capital.  More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for 
an episode to qualify as a “sudden stop”:  (1) the country in question must have received 
an inflow of capital (relative to GDP) larger than its region’s third quartile during the two 
years prior to the “sudden stop.”  And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at 
least 5% of GDP in one year.
18  On the other hand, a “current account reversal” – 
reversals, in short -- is defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4% 
of GDP in one year.
19   
  Table 4 presents tabulation data on the incidence of sudden stops for the period 
under study; Table 5 contains data on the incidence of current account reversals.  In both 
Tables I have considered six groups of countries – industrial, Latin America and 
Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe.  Each Table 
also includes a Pearson test for equality of incidence across groups of countries.  As may 
be seen, the total historical incidence of sudden stops has been 6.4%.  Different countries, 
however, have experienced very different realities, with the incidence being highest in the 
Middle East (11.3%) and lowest in the industrial nations (3.7%).  The tabulation on 
reversals in Table 5 indicates that the aggregate incidence rate has been 12.8%; Latin 
America, Africa and the Middle East have had the highest incidence at 16%, and the 
industrial countries have had the lowest incidence at 2.4%. 
From an analytical perspective sudden stops and reversals should be highly 
related phenomena. There is no reason, however, for their relationship to be one-to-one.  
Indeed, because of changes in international reserves it is perfectly possible that a country 
that suffers a sudden stop does not experience at the same time a current account reversal.  
In Table 6 I present two-way frequency tables for the “sudden stops” and the current 
                                                            
18 In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions of sudden stops, 
which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7 of GDP in one year.  Due to space considerations, 
however, I don’t report detailed results using these definitions. 3/3/2005  15 
account deficit reversal, both for the complete sample as well as for the six regions.  The 
Table shows that for the complete sample (3,106 observations) 46.8% of countries 
subject to a sudden stop also faced a current account reversal.  At the same time, 22.8% 
of those with reversals also experienced (in the same year) a sudden stop of capital 
inflows.  The regional data show that joint incidence of reversals and “sudden stops” has 
been highest in Africa, where approximately 59.3% of sudden stops happened at the same 
time as current account reversals, and in Latin America where 25% of reversals coincided 
with sudden stops.  Notice that for every one of the regions, as well as for the complete 
sample, the Pearson c
2 tests have very small p-values, indicating that the observed 
differences across rows and columns are significant.  That is, these tests suggest that 
although there are observed differences across these phenomena, the two are statistically 
related.  Interestingly, these results do not change in any significant way if different 
definitions of reversals and sudden stops are used, or if alternative configurations of lags 
and leads are considered.  
IV.2 Sudden Stops, Reversals and Capital Controls 
  The tabulation results presented above, on sudden stops and current account 
reversals (Tables 5 and 6), did not group countries according to their degree of capital 
mobility.  In Table 7 I report the incidence of both sudden stops and current account 
reversals for the three categories of capital mobility defined above:  High, Intermediate 
and Low capital mobility.  The Table also presents the p-values for Pearson tests on the 
equality of incidence across regions, as well as t-statistics (and their p-values) on the 
equality of incidence under High mobility and Low mobility on the one hand, and 
equality of incidence under High mobility and Intermediate mobility, on the other hand 
(these tests are presented both at the country-group as well as aggregate levels).  The 
results obtained may be summarized as follows:  
   
·  For the complete sample, the incidence of current account reversals is 
significantly lower for countries with High capital mobility than for countries 
with either Intermediate or Low mobility.  This aggregate result is somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 I also used an alternative definition.  The qualitative nature of the results discussed below, were not 
affected by the precise definition of reversals or sudden stops.  See Edwards (2002). 3/3/2005  16 
deceiving, however, since there are marked differences in incidence across 
groups of countries.
20  As may be seen from Table 7, for industrial countries 
the incidence of reversals has been significantly smaller in countries with 
High mobility.  In Asia, on the other hand, countries with Low mobility have 
had a significantly lower incidence of reversals than nations with High capital 
mobility.  For the rest of the country groups there are no statistical differences 
in the incidence of reversals across degrees of capital mobility. 
·  For sudden stops, the results for the complete sample suggest that there are no 
statistical differences in incidence across countries with different degrees of 
capital mobility.  At the country groups levels there are some differences, 
however.  For industrial countries the incidence of sudden stops is smaller 
under High capital mobility; the opposite is true for the Asian and Eastern 
European countries.  The t-statistics in Table 7 indicate that for Latin America, 
Africa and the Middle East there are no statistical differences in the incidence 
of sudden stops according to the degree of capital mobility. 
   
  The results presented in Table 7 were obtained when the contemporaneous value 
of the index was used to classify countries as having High, Intermediate or Low degree of 
capital mobility.  It is possible to argue, however, that what matters is not the degree of 
capital mobility in a particular year, but the policy stance on capital mobility in the 
medium term.  In order to investigate whether an alternative classification makes a 
difference, I re-classified countries as High, Intermediate and Low capital mobility using 
the average value in the index in the previous 5 years.  The results obtained are reported 
in Table 8; as may be seen, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 7.   
IV.3  Banking Crises  
  In this sub-section I investigate whether sudden stops and current account 
reversals have historically been related to banking crises.  A number of authors have 
argued that one of the costliest effects of external shocks is that they tend to generate 
banking crises and collapses.   Most analyses on this subject have focused on the joint 
                                                            
20   Indeed, according to the Person test the null hypothesis of equality of incidence across country-group 
categories is strongly rejected. 3/3/2005  17 
occurrence of devaluation crises and banking crises – see, for example, the discussion in 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).  In this sub-section I take a slightly different approach, 
and I investigate whether sudden stops and major current account deficits – not all of 
which end up in devaluation crises, as established in Edwards (2004a) -- have been 
associated with banking crises.  I address this issue in Tables 9 and 10, where I present 
two-way tabulations for current account reversals and a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if that year there has been a banking crisis (Table 9), and for sudden stops 
and banking crises (Table 10).
21  All panels in Table 9 – see, in particular, the Pearson c
2 
tests for independence of rows and columns -- show that there has not been a significant 
relation, between reversals and major banking crises.  Interestingly, this is the case for all 
three groups of capital mobility.   
  The results in Table 10 refer to sudden stops and banking crises, and are very 
similar.  They indicate that there has been no significant relation – at any level of capital 
mobility – between sudden stops and banking crises (see he Pearson c
2 tests for 
independence of rows and columns).  It is important to note that this is the case 
independently of the lag-lead structure considered.  In sum, the results reported in Tables 
9 and 10 indicate that, contrary to what some critics of capital account liberalization have 
argued, higher capital mobility has not been associated with a higher occurrence of 
banking crisis; banking crisis have occurred at the same rate in countries with High, 
Intermediate and Low capital mobility.
22 
 
V.  Capital Controls and the Costs of External Crises 
According to the analysis presented in the preceding section, there is no clear 
evidence supporting the view that Low capital mobility countries – that is, countries that 
impose heavy restrictions (or controls) on the mobility of capital – have a significantly 
lower incidence of sudden stops or current account reversals.  In this section I take the 
analysis a step further, and I investigate whether current account reversals and sudden 
stops have historically had significant costs, in terms of a lower GDP growth.  More 
                                                            
21 The data on banking crises are from Glick and Hutchison (1999).  When an alternative definition of 
reversals is used the results are similar to those reported in this section 3/3/2005  18 
important, in terms of the current paper, I analyze whether the (potential) costs of sudden 
stops and reversals have been different in countries with different degrees of capital 
mobility.   
The section is organized as follows:  I first present a preliminary analysis, where I 
compare growth before and after sudden stops and current account reversal episodes, for 
countries with different degrees of capital mobility.  I then present results obtained from 
an econometric analysis that estimates jointly – using treatment regressions – the 
probability of having a crisis and the effect of the crisis on GDP growth.  As pointed out, 
the main interest in this analysis is to determine whether the extent of capital mobility 
plays a role in explaining countries’ propensity to having crises, and the costs associated 
with crises. 
V.1   Sudden Stops, Current Account Reversals, Capital Controls and Growth:  A 
Preliminary Analysis  
  In Table 11 I present a “before and after” analysis on GDP per capita growth for 
sudden stops and reversals.  This analysis has been done for all countries, as well as for 
countries grouped according to their degree of capital mobility.  The “before” data 
corresponds to average GDP per capita growth during the three years before the crisis.  I 
have computed two “after” rates of growth:  (a) The year of the crisis, and (b) the average 
during three years after the crisis.   Panel A in Table 11 contains the results for one year 
after the crisis; Panel B contains results for three year after the crisis.  The first four 
columns in both panels in Table 11 contain the average difference in the rate of growth 
per capita after and before the crisis.  Column one is for all countries; columns two 
through four are for countries with High, Intermediate and Low capital mobility.   The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the “before and after” 
rates of growth are equal.  The final two columns – columns (E) and (F) – are diff-in-diffs 
columns, which report the difference in the before and after growth rates for High and 
Intermediate and High and Low capital mobility; that is the number in column (E) is 
equal to Column (B) minus (C).  The number in parenthesis is for the null hypothesis that 
this diff-in-diff is equal to zero.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
22   I also analyzed the incidence of sudden stops, current account reversals and IMF programs.  The results 
obtained indicate that there is no relation between sudden stops and reversals on the one hand, and IMF 
programs on the other. 3/3/2005  19 
  As may be seen from Table 11, these preliminary results suggest that, generally 
speaking, there are no significant differences in growth before and after the crises; this is 
the case for all categories of capital mobility.  Notice that only 3 out of the 24 t-statistics 
in Table 11 are significant at conventional levels.  As emphasized above, however, these 
results are only preliminary, since no attempt has been made to control for other factors, 
or to incorporate the determinants of the probability of a crisis.
23  In the subsection that 
follows I deal with these issues by using a treatment regression methodology. 
V.2    An Econometric Analysis 
  In this sub-section I present results from an econometric analysis that deals with 
two questions:  (a) does a higher degree of capital mobility increase the probability of a 
crisis (defined as a sudden stop or as a current account reversal)? (b)  Does the degree of 
capital mobility affect the cost of crises, once they occur?  The discussion proceeds as 
follows: I first present a simple analysis on the effects of sudden stops and current 
account reversals on growth (section V.2.1); I then present results from the joint 
estimation of crises’ probabilities and dynamics of growth equations (Section V.3). 
V.2.1  Growth Effects of Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals:  Preliminary 
Econometric Results 
As in Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2004), the point of departure of the empirical 
analysis is a two-equation formulation for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of 
country j in period t. Equation (1) is the long run GDP growth equation, while equation 
(2) captures the growth dynamics process. 
 
(1)     g* j =  a + x j b + r j q  + w j. 
 
(2)     D g t j =  l [ g* j – g t-1  j ] + j v t j + g u t j + x t j .    
 
I have used the following notation: g* j is the long run rate of real per capita GDP 
growth in country j; x j is a vector of structural, institutional and policy variables that 
determine long run growth; r j is a vector of regional dummies; a, b and q are 
                                                            
23  Hong and Tornell (2004), however, have used a similar methodology and found that there are growth 
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parameters, and w j is an error term assumed to be heteroskedastic. In equation (2), g t j is 
the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j in period t. The terms v t j and u t j are 
shocks, assumed to have zero mean, finite variance and to be uncorrelated among them. 
More specifically, v t j is assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, while u t j 
captures other shocks, including sudden stops and current account reversals. x t j is an 
error term, which is assumed to be heteroskedastic (see equation (3) below for details), 
and l, j, and  g are parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth 
process.  Equation (2) -- which has the form of an equilibrium correction model (ECM) --
, states that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of 
growth due to the existence of three types of shocks: v t j, u t j and x t j.  Over time, 
however, the actual rate of growth will tend to converge towards it long run value, with 
the rate of convergence given by l. Parameter j, in equation (2), is expected to be 
positive, indicating that an improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) 
acceleration in the rate of growth, and that negative terms of trade shock are expected to 
have a negative effect on g t  j.
24  The main interest from the perspective of the current 
paper is whether sudden stops and current account reversals have a negative effect on 
growth; that is, whether coefficient g is significantly negative.  In the actual estimation of 
equation 1, I used dummy variables for sudden stops and reversals.  An important 
question – and one that is addressed in detail in the Subsection that follows – is whether 
the effects of different shocks on growth are different for countries with different degrees 
of capital mobility. 
The system (1) - (2) was estimated using a two step procedure. In the first step I 
estimate the long run growth equation (2) using a cross-country data set.  These data are 
averages for 1974-2000, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. 
These first stage estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to 
replace g*j in the equilibrium error correction model (2).  In the second step, I estimated 
equation (2) using GLS procedure for unbalanced panels; I used both random effects and 
fixed effects estimation procedures.
   The data set used covers 157 countries, for the 
1970-2000 period; not every country has data for every year, however.  See the Data 
Appendix for exact data definition and data sources. 
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The results from the first step estimation of equation (1) are not reported due to 
space considerations.
25  Table 12 presents the results from the second step estimation of 
the growth dynamics equation (2).  The first two equations refer to current account 
reversals, while the next two equations focus on sudden stops.  Finally, in equations 
(12.5) and (12.6) I included both the sudden stops and the reversals variables as 
regressors.   
The estimated coefficient of [ g
*
 j – g t-1  j ] is, as expected, positive, significant, 
and smaller than one.  The point estimates are on the high side -- between 0.81 and 0.88 -
-, suggesting that, on average, deviations between long run and actual growth get 
eliminated rather quickly.  For instance, according to equation (12.1), after 3 years 
approximately 90% of a unitary shock to real GDP growth per capita will be eliminated.  
Also, as expected, the estimated coefficients of the terms of trade shock are always 
positive, and statistically significant, indicating that an improvement (deterioration) in the 
terms of trade results in an acceleration (de-acceleration) in the rate of growth of real per 
capita GDP.  As may be seen from equations (12.1) and (12.2), the coefficient of the 
current account reversals variable is significantly negative, indicating that reversals result 
in a deceleration of growth.  The point estimate is -2.01, indicating that, with other things 
given, a reversal has on average resulted in a 2% reduction in short term growth on 
average.  The results from equations (12.3) and (12.4) refer to sudden stops.  They show 
that the estimated coefficients of the sudden stop dummies are significantly negative, 
with a point estimate that ranges from -1.23 to -1.25.  This suggests that while sudden 
stops have also have a negative effect on per capita growth, their impact on growth has 
not been as severe as the impact of reversal episodes.   
The results in equations (12.5) and (12.6), where both the current account 
reversals and the sudden stop dummies have been included, are particularly interesting:  
while the reversal dummies continue to be significantly negative, the coefficient for the 
                                                            
25  In estimating equation (1) for long-run per capita growth, I follow the by now standard literature on 
growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), and use average data for 1974-2000.  In terms 
of the equation specification, I include the following covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the 
investment ratio; the coverage of secondary education; an index of the degree of openness of the economy; 
the ratio of government consumption relative to GDP; and regional dummies for Latin American, Sub 
Saharan African and Transition economies.   The results are quiet standard, and support what by now has 
become the “received wisdom” on the empirical determinants of long term growth. 
 3/3/2005  22 
sudden stop dummy is not significant any longer.  This suggests that what is costly – in 
terms of lower GDP per capita growth – is not a sudden stop per se.  Indeed, according to 
these results, what is costly in terms of lower growth is a current account reversal.  This 
is an important finding, since it suggests that countries that experience a sudden stop, but 
are able – through the use of international reserves – to avoid a current account reversal 
will not face a significant decline in growth.  More over, this result suggests that sudden 
stops have an indirect (negative) effect on growth.  According to this conjecture, the 
occurrence of a sudden stop increases the probability of a current account reversal.  The 
reversal, in turn, will have a negative impact on GDP per capita growth.  I formally 
investigate this hypothesis in the Subsection that follows. 
V.2.2  Joint Estimation 
I use a “treatment effects” model to estimate jointly an equation on real GDP 
growth and a probit equation on the probability that a country experiences a current 
account reversal. The base empirical treatment effects model is as follows:    
 
(1’)    g* j   =    a + x j b + r j q  + w j. 
 
(2’)    D g t j   =    l [ g* j – g t-1  j ] + j v t j + g u t j + q (u t j ´Openness t j) + x t j .   
 
 
                              1,    if    u*t j   > 0 
(3)     u t j     =      
                   0,     otherwise 
 
 
(4)    u*t j     =    w j t a  + e j t . 
 
As before, equation (1’) is the long term real growth equation, and equation (2’) is the 
growth dynamics equation.   u j t is a dummy variable (i.e. the treatment variable) that 
takes a value of one if country j in period t experienced a current account reversal, and 
zero if the country did not experience reversal.  Accordingly, ￿ is the parameter of 3/3/2005  23 
interest: the effect of the treatment on the outcome.  Finally, (u t j ´Openness t j) is a 
variable that interacts u t j with a measure of openness.  The coefficient of this interactive 
variable q will capture the effect of openness on the transmission of external shocks on 
growth.  In the estimation I used two alternative measures of openness: the index of 
capital account openness presented in Section III of this paper; and a measure of trade 
openness (defined as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP). 
According to equation (3), whether the country experiences a current account 
reversal is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent variable u* j t.   u* j t, in turn, is 
assumed to depend linearly on vector w j t.  In the estimation, one of the w j t variables is 
the degree of capital mobility, or financial openness.  Some of the variables in w j t may 
be included in x j t .
26  b and a are parameter vectors to be estimated. m j t  and e j t are error 
terms assumed to be bivariate normal, with a zero mean and a covariance matrix given 
by: 
 
           s  ￿ 
(5)         ￿  1   
 
 
If equations (2’) and (3) are independent, the covariance term ￿ in equation (5) 
will be zero.  Under most plausible conditions, however, it is likely that this covariance 
term will be different from zero (See Wooldridge 2002 for details).  The model in 
equations (1’) – (5) will satisfy the consistency and identifying conditions of mixed 
models with latent variables if the outcome variable y j t is not a determinant of the 
treatment equation -- that is, if y is not one of the variables in w in equation (3).
27  As is 
clear in the discussion that follows, in the estimation of the model (1’) - (5) we impose a 
number of exclusionary restrictions; that is, a number of variables in vector wj t are not 
included in vector xj t.  
                                                            
26   For details on the identification requirements for this type of models see, for example, Wooldridge 
(2002).  
27 Details on identification and consistency of models with mixed structures can be found in Maddala 
(1983).  See, also, Heckman (1978) and Angrist (2000). 3/3/2005  24 
The system (1’) – (5) was estimated using a three-step procedure.  The first step 
consists of estimating the long run growth equation 91’).  The results from this estimation 
are used to compute the growth gap term [ g* j – g t-1  j ].  In the second step the treatment 
equation on the probability of having a current account reversal is estimated using a 
probit procedure.  From this estimation a hazard is obtained for each j,t observation.  In 
the third step, the outcome equation (2’) is estimated with the hazard added as an 
additional covariate; in this third step the outcome equation is estimated using fixed 
effects.  From the residuals of this augmented outcome regression, it is possible to 
compute consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix (4) (See Maddala 1983, 
and Wooldridge 2002 for details). 
The Treatment Equation: Following work by Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-
Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002) among others, in the estimation of the first 
treatment (probit) I included the following covariates: (a) The index of capital mobility 
discussed in Section III.  If, as critics of capital mobility have argued, greater mobility 
increases countries’ vulnerability to crises, the estimated coefficient should be 
significantly positive. (b) The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP lagged one and 
two periods.  It is expected that, with other things given, countries with a larger current 
account deficit will have a higher probability of experiencing a reversal.  The best results 
were obtained when the one-year legged deficit was included.  (c) A sudden stop dummy 
that takes the value of one if the country in question has experienced a sudden stop in that 
particular year.  Its coefficient is expected to be positive. (d) An index that measures the 
relative occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region (excluding the country itself) 
during that particular year.  This variable captures the effect of “regional contagion;” its 
coefficient is expected to be positive.  (e) The one-year lagged external debt over GDP 
ratio.  Its coefficient is expected to be positive.  (f)  An index that measures whether the 
country in question has been subject to a banking crisis, the year in question.  Its 
coefficient will measure the extent to which banking and external (i.e. current account 
reversals) have tended to occur jointly.  (g) The ratio of net international reserves to 
GDP, lagged one year.  Its coefficient is expected to be negative, indicating that with 
other things given countries with a higher stock of reserves have a lower probability of 
experiencing a current account reversal.  (h) Short term (less than one-year maturity) 3/3/2005  25 
external debt as a proportion of external debt, lagged one period.  Its coefficient is 
expected to be positive.  (i) The one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic credit.  Its 
coefficient is expected to be positive.  (j) The lagged ratio of external debt service to 
exports.  Again, its coefficient is expected to be positive.  (k) The country’s initial GDP 
per capita (in logs). (g)  Country fixed-effect dummies.  In some of the probit regressions 
I also included an index that measures the extent of dollarization in the country in 
question.  Also, in some specifications I included the ratio of FDI to GDP, and the public 
sector deficit (both lagged).  Their coefficients were not significant, however.  Since 
these variables were available for a relatively smaller number of observations than the 
other variables, they were not included in the final specification of the probit equations 
reported in this section. 
In Table 13 I summarize the basic results obtained from the estimation of number 
of treatment models for GDP growth (the coefficients of the country specific fixed-effect 
variables are not reported due to space considerations). The table contains two panels.  
The upper panel includes the results from the growth outcome equation (2’); the lower 
panel contains the estimates for the “treatment equation,” or probit equation on the 
probability of experiencing a current account reversal.  As pointed out above, the 
treatment observations correspond to current account reversal episodes, and the untreated 
group is comprised of all country-year observations were there have been no reversals.
28 
Table 13 also includes the estimated coefficient of the hazard variable in the third step 
estimation, as well as the estimated elements of the variance-covariance matrix (5).  
Probability of Experiencing a Current Account Reversal: The probit estimates are 
presented in the lower panel of Table 13.  I discuss first the results in equations (13.1) 
and (13.2), since they were estimated over a larger sample.  As may be seen, the results 
are similar across models and are quite satisfactory.  Most of the coefficients have the 
expected signs, and many of them are statistically significant at conventional levels.  A 
particularly interesting result is that in every equation the estimated coefficient of the 
capital mobility index was negative (although it was not significant at conventional 
levels).  This was also the case when lagged values of this index were included to the 
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many countries there are no data on the (potential) determinants of the probability of a current account 
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estimation.  These results suggest that, contrary to what has been argued by the critics of 
financial liberalization, a greater degree of capital account openness has not increased the 
degree of vulnerability in the world economy.  If anything, these results provide some 
(preliminary and weak) evidence suggesting that countries with a higher degree of capital 
mobility have had a lower probability of experiencing a current account reversal.  The 
results in Table 13.B also indicate that the probability of experiencing a reversal is higher 
for countries with a large (lagged) current account deficit, and a high external debt ratio.  
Countries that have experienced a sudden stop also have a high probability of a current 
account reversal, as have countries that are in a region where many countries experience 
a sudden stop (that is, there is evidence of regional contagion).  The coefficient of net 
international reserves is negative as expected, and it is significant at the 10% level in 
equations (13.1) and (13.2).  The coefficients of the short-term debt and total debt service 
have the expected signs, but tend not to be significant.  The coefficients of initial GDP 
per capita are negative but not significant.  Overall, when different lag structures of the 
regressors were considered, the nature of the results did not change. 
An important policy issue has to do with the effects of dollarization and dollarized 
liabilities on macroeconomic vulnerability and on the costs of crises.  If, as argued by 
Calvo et al (2003) countries with dollarized financial systems are particularly vulnerable 
to external shocks, one would expect that dollarization would affect positively the 
probability of facing a reversal.  Unfortunately, there are no extensive data sets on 
dollarization across countries and time.  It is possible, however, to use a more limited 
data set – both in terms of years and countries’ coverage – to further investigate this 
issue.  I use the data set recently assembled by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) 
that covers 117 countries for the period 1996-201.   This index goes from 1 to 30, with 
higher numbers indicating higher degrees of dollarization.  The results obtained when this 
index is included in the treatment regression are reported in equation (13.3).  As may be 
seen, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that a higher degree 
of dollarization increases the probability of a country experiencing a current account 
reversal.
29  This result support findings by Edwards (2004a) and Calvo et. al. (2004).  
                                                            
29   The Reinhart et al (2003) dollarization index refers only to the period 1996-2002.  I have assumed, 
however, that the extent of dollarization detected by Reinhart et. al. applies to the 1976-2000 period.  For 
this reason the results reported here should be taken with a grain of salt. 3/3/2005  27 
Notice, however, that due to the limited nature of the dollarization data, the number of 
observations in regression (13.3) is significantly smaller than in the original regressions. 
  GDP Growth Models: The results from the estimation of the growth equation are 
reported in Panel A of Table 13.  I discuss first the results from the first two equations 
that exclude the dollarization variable. As may be seen, the coefficient for the growth gap 
variable is significantly positive and smaller than one, as expected.  The point estimates 
are similar to those reported in Table 12.  Also, as in Table 12 the coefficients of the 
terms of trade shocks are significantly positive.  The coefficient of the current account 
reversal variable is significantly negative, indicating that a current account reversal has a 
negative effect on growth.   
Interestingly, in both equations (13.1) and (13.2) the coefficient of the variable 
that interact the reversal dummy and an index of trade openness are significantly positive.  
This means that the less open the country is to trade, the higher will be the cost of a 
current account reversal, in terms of lower growth.  These results are consistent with a 
number of open economy macroeconomic models, which postulate that the costs of 
foreign shocks – including the costs of current account reversals -- are inversely 
proportional to the country’s degree of openness.  In Mundell-Fleming type of models, 
for example, the expenditure reducing effort, for any given level of expenditure 
switching, is inversely proportional to the marginal propensity to import.  Recently, 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) developed a model where sudden stops result in abrupt 
current account reversals, and in major real exchange rate depreciations. Depreciations, in 
turn, are contractionary, with the extent of the contraction depending inversely on the 
degree of trade openness of the economy.  They argue that sudden stops and current 
account reversals will have a greater impact in closed economies – such as Argentina – 
than in more open ones, such as Chile.   
In order to investigate the degree of capital mobility affects the cost of an external 
crisis characterized by a current account reversal, in the equation (13.2) I also included a 
variable that interacts the current account reversal with the capital mobility index.  As 
may be seen, the estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level.  
According to these results the growth effects of a reversal are given by the following 
expression: 3/3/2005  28 
 
(6)    Growth effect = -3.93 + 0.02´Trade Openness – 0.03´Capital Mobility. 
 
This means that, with other things given, the decline in GDP per capita growth will be 
more pronounced in a country with a higher degree of capital mobility that in one with a 
lower degree of capital mobility.  Consider, for example, the case of two countries that 
have the same degree of trade openness – say, 60%.  Assume further that while one 
countries has a low degree of capital mobility (an index of 25), the other country has a 
high degree of mobility (index of 90).  According to equation (6) the country with low 
capital mobility will experience a decline in growth of 3.48% as a consequence of the 
reversal. The country with high mobility, on the other hand, will experience a decline in 
growth of 5.43%. 
  Finally, in equation (13.3) I included a dollarization index in the treatment 
equation.  As discussed earlier, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, 
indicating that countries with a higher degree of dollarization have a higher probability of 
experiencing a reversal.  Notice that in the outcome equation on GDP growth (13.3) the 
reversal coefficient is still significantly negative.  The coefficients of the two interactive 
variables (reversal and trade openness, and reversal and capital mobility) are not 
significantly any longer.  This, however, is likely to be the result of using a much smaller 
and restricted data set than in the two base equations. 
  To summarize, the results reported in this section indicate that current account 
reversals are costly, in the sense that they result in a (temporary) reduction in GDP per 
capita growth.  Notice that this contrasts with results reported by Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 
(2000), who argued that “reversals… are not systematically associated with a growth 
slowdown (p. 303).”   The results reported in this paper also indicate that it is the 
reversals that are costly; once reversals are introduced into the analysis the coefficient of 
sudden stops is not significant in the growth dynamics equations.  The regression results 
reported in Table 13 also indicate that the degree of capital mobility does not have a 
significant effect on the probability of a country facing a crisis.  However, these results 
indicate that once a reversal has taken place, countries with a higher degree of capital 
mobility will experience a deeper drop in growth. 3/3/2005  29 
V.2.3 Endogeneity and Robustness 
  The results presented in Table 13 assume that capital mobility is exogenous to the 
current account.  In particular, it is assumed that the restrictions on capital mobility don’t 
change if the probability of a reversal becomes higher.  This, however, needs not be the 
case.  Indeed, some authors have argued that as a country’s external position worsens, 
policy makers will have a temptation to heighten restrictions on capital mobility, and in 
particular on capital outflows.
30  If this is indeed the case, estimates that ignore potential 
endogeneity will be biased.
31  In order to address this issue I estimated the equation on 
the probability of experiencing a current account reversal using an instrumental variables 
probit procedure based on Amemiya’s generalized least squares estimators with 
endogenous regressors.  In the estimation I used two alternative sets of instruments: (a) 
the first set includes change in the terms of trade (as a measure of external real shocks), 
the world rate of interest (as a measure of external financial shocks), and a measure of 
trade openness obtained as the fitted value from a gravity model of bilateral trade.
32 (b) In 
the second set of instruments, I added the three-year lagged current account balance to 
the instruments in (a).  The results obtained under both sets of instruments are very 
similar, and are presented in Table 14.  As may be seen, by and large, these IV probit 
estimates confirm the results presented in panel B of Table 13 for the treatment 
regressions.  The signs of all coefficients have been preserved.  It is important to notice, 
however, that the coefficients of international reserves and external debt, which were 
significant in Table 13, are not statistically significant at conventional levels in Table 14.  
More important for the subject of this paper, the coefficient of the capital mobility index 
continues to be negative and insignificant, indicating that the probability of a current 
account reversal is not different for countries with a high degree of capital mobility than 
for countries with a low degree of capital mobility. 
  In order to investigate further the robustness of the results reported in Tables 12 
and 13 I analyzed the potential role of outliers, and I considered somewhat different 
samples, as well as different specifications.  These robustness checks indicate that, from a 
                                                            
30   See, for example, Edwards (1989). 
31   Notice, however, that the results in Table 13 use the lagged value of the capital mobility index.   3/3/2005  30 
qualitative point of view, the results discussed above are not affected by the choice of 
sample, specification or outliers.  Further research, however, should focus on generating 
more detailed and comprehensive indexes of capital mobility. 
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
            In this paper I have used a broad multi-country data set to analyze the relationship 
between restrictions to capital mobility and external crises.  The analysis focuses on two 
manifestations of external crises that have received considerable attention during the last 
few years:  (a) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (b) current account reversals.  I have 
tried to deal with two important policy-related issues: First, does the extent of capital 
mobility affect countries’ degree of vulnerability to external crises; and second, does the 
extent of capital mobility determine the depth of external crises – as measured by the 
decline in growth --, once the crises occur?   
In analyzing these issues I relied on two complementary approaches: First, I used 
a methodology based on the computation of non-parametric tests and frequency tables to 
analyze the incidence and main characteristics of both sudden stops and current account 
reversals in countries with different degrees of capital controls.  And second, I used a 
regression-based analysis that estimates jointly the probability of having a crisis, and the 
cost of such crisis, in terms of short-term declines in output growth.  Overall, my results 
cast some doubts on the assertion that increased capital mobility has caused heightened 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities.  I have found no systematic evidence suggesting that 
countries with higher capital mobility tend to have a higher incidence of crises, or tended 
to face a higher probability of having a crisis, than countries with lower mobility.  My 
results do suggest, however, that once a crisis occurs, countries with higher capital 
mobility tend to face a higher cost, in terms of growth decline.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
32   As Aizenman and Noy (2004) have shown, there is a strong empirical connection between trade 
openness and the degree of capital mobility.  The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in 
panel estimation has been pioneered by Jeff Frankel.  See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004). 3/3/2005  31 
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1=Industrial countries, 2= Latin American and Caribbean, 3=Asia,  
4=Africa, 5=Middle East, and 6=Eastern Europe 
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Table 1 
Capital Mobility Index by Groups 
 
Group  Mean  Median  St. Dev. 
       
Low Capital Mobility  30.0  37.5  9.9 
High Capital Mobility  82.5  87.5  12.3 
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Table 2 
Countries with Very High and Very Low Capital Mobility 
1970-1979  1980-1989  1990-2000 
 
Very High Capital Mobility 
           
Bahrain  87.5  Antigua and Barbuda  87.5  Austria  87.5 
Gambia, The  87.5  Bahrain  87.5  Belgium  96.6 
Germany  96.3  Germany  98.8  Canada  100.0 
Hong Kong, China  95.0  Hong Kong, China  100.0  Denmark  100.0 
Lebanon  87.5  Kuwait  87.5  Estonia  87.5 
Panama  100.0  Lebanon  87.5  Finland  95.4 
Switzerland  93.8  Netherlands  92.5  France  90.9 
United Arab Em.  87.5  Panama  95.0  Germany  100.0 
United States  95.0  Singapore  100.0  Guatemala  100.0 
    Switzerland  100.0  Hong Kong, China  100.0 
    United Arab Emirates  87.5  Ireland  93.1 
    United Kingdom  100.0  Italy  96.6 
    United States  100.0  Kuwait  87.5 
    Uruguay  95.0  Kyrgyz Republic  87.5 
    Vanuatu  87.5  Latvia  87.5 
        Lebanon  87.5 
        Lithuania  87.5 
        Netherlands  100.0 
        New Zealand  93.1 
        Norway  100.0 
        Singapore  97.7 
        Sweden  87.5 
        Switzerland  100.0 
        United Arab Em.  87.5 
        United Kingdom  100.0 
        United States  100.0 
        Uruguay  93.1 
        Vanuatu  87.5 
           
Very Low Capital Mobility 
           
China  0.0  Bangladesh  12.5  -  - 
Ethiopia  12.5  Iceland  12.5  -  - 
Iceland  12.5  Morocco  10.0  -  - 
Morocco  3.8  Sri Lanka  12.5  -  - 
South Africa  7.3  -  -  -  - 
Sri Lanka  12.5  -  -  -  - 
           
Very high capital mobility countries are those with average mobility index higher or equal than 87.5. Very 
low capital mobility countries are those with average mobility index lower or equal than 12.5 
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Table 3 
Countries with Major Changes in Capital Mobility Index 
 
1970-1974  1975-1979  1980-1984  1985-1989  1990-1994  1995-2000 
           
From High to Low Capital Mobility
a 
           
-  Uruguay  Barbados  -  -  - 
-  -  Grenada  -  -  - 
-  -  Haiti  -  -  - 
-  -  Mexico  -  -  - 
-  -  Nicaragua  -  -  - 
-  -  Paraguay  -  -  - 
 
From Low to High Capital Mobility 
           
-  -  Australia  Portugal  Argentina  Colombia 
-  -  Norway  -  Costa Rica  Ecuador 
-  -  Uruguay  -  El Salvador  Egypt 
-  -  -  -  Grenada  Guyana 
-  -  -  -  Hungary  Haiti    
-  -  -  -  Mexico  Iceland 
-  -  -  -  Paraguay  Israel 
-  -  -  -  Peru  Jamaica 
-  -  -  -  Philippines  Jordan 
-  -  -  -  Trin. & Tob.  Kenya    
-  -  -  -  -  Lao PDR 
-  -  -  -  -  Mauritania 
-  -  -  -  -  Nicaragua 
-  -  -  -  -  Rwanda 
-  -  -  -  -  Uganda 
-  -  -  -  -  Zambia 
a countries with high capital mobility index in period t-1, and low capital mobility index in period t. 
b countries with low capital mobility index in period t-1, and high capital mobility index in period t. 
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Table 4 
Incidence of Sudden Stops 
 
Region  No sudden stop  Sudden stop 
     
Industrial countries  96.3  3.7 
Latin American and Caribbean  92.2  7.8 
Asia  94.9  5.1 
Africa  93.4  6.6 
Middle East  88.7  11.3 
Eastern Europe  93.7  6.4 
     
Total  93.6  6.4 
     
     Observations  2,943   
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  18.84   
         Design-based F(5, 14710)  3.76   
          P-value  0.002   
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Table 5 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals 
 
Region  No Reversal  Reversal 
     
Industrial countries  97.6  2.4 
Latin American and Caribbean  84.0  16.0 
Asia  87.9  12.1 
Africa  83.4  16.1 
Middle East  84.0  16.0 
Eastern Europe  85.0  15.0 
     
Total  87.2  12.8 
     
    Observations  2,975   
    Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  77.88   
         Design-based F(5, 14870)  15.57   
          P-value  0.000   
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Table 6 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops* 
 
All countries 
  Sudden stop 
Reversal  0  1  Total 
0  2,587  107  2,694 
  96.0  4.0  100.0 
  89.1  53.2  86.7 
1  318  94  412 
  77.2  22.8  100.0 
  11.0  46.8  13.3 
Total  2,905  201  3,106 
  93.5  6.5  100.0 
  100  100  100 
Pearson chi2(1) = 209.65   Pr = 0.000 
 
 
  Industrial countries  Latin America 
  Sudden stop  Sudden stop 
Reversal  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  552  19  571  605  24  629 
  96.7  3.3  100.0  96.2  3.8  100.0 
  98.2  82.6  97.6  87.1  44.4  84.0 
1  10  4  14  90  30  120 
  71.4  28.6  100.0  75.0  25.0  100.0 
  1.8  17.4  2.4  13.0  55.6  16.0 
Total  562  23  585  695  54  749 
  96.1  3.9  100.0  92.8  7.2  100.0 
  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Pearson c
2(1)    23.06    67.60      
P-value  0.000    0.000   
 
  Asia  Africa 
  Sudden stop  Sudden stop 
Reversal  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  328  12  340  689  22  711 
  96.5  3.5  100.0  96.9  3.1  100.0 
  87.7  60.0  86.3  85.2  40.7  82.4 
1  46  8  54  120  32  152 
  85.2  14.8  100.0  79.0  21.1  100.0 
  12.3  40.0  13.7  14.8  59.3  17.6 
Total  374  20  394  809  54  863 
  94.9  5.1  100.0  93.7  6.3  100.0 
  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Pearson c
2(1)    12.32    68.85      
P-value  0.001    0.000   
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Table 6 (Continuation) 
 
  Middle East  Eastern Europe 
  Sudden stop  Sudden stop 
Reversal  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  185  13  198  195  11  206 
  93.4  6.6  100.0  94.7  5.3  100.0 
  88.5  54.2  85.0  89.9  64.7  88.0 
1  24  11  35  22  6  28 
  68.6  31.4  100.0  78.6  21.4  100.0 
  11.5  45.8  15.0  10.1  35.3  12.0 
Total  209  24  233  217  17  234 
  89.7  10.3  100.0  92.7  7.3  100.0 
  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Pearson c
2(1)    19.90    9.47   
P-value  0.000    0.002   
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Table 7 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops  
by Categories of Capital Mobility 
(1-year for Capital Mobility Index) 
  Current Account Reversals  Sudden Stops 
  High  Int.  Low  t-test
a  High  Int.  Low  t-test
a 
        H=I  H=L        H=I  H=L 
Industrial  1.1  3.5  16.7  1.71  6.40*  2.3  7.9  11.1  2.72*  3.01* 
Latin America  14.6  18.2  15.9  1.04  0.44  7.2  7.1  8.9  0.05  0.72 
Asia  16.1  18.0  7.3  0.35  2.65*  11.7  4.1  1.1  1.85  4.22* 
Africa  14.3  19.7  15.0  1.31  0.18  5.9  8.1  5.5  0.80  0.16 
Middle east  13.8  11.4  20.3  0.40  1.12  11.5  6.8  13.7  0.84  0.42 
Eastern Europe  14.0  24.4  5.1  1.24  1.34  14.3  4.7  0.0  1.52  2.58* 
                     
Total  9.1  17.1  13.7  5.27*  3.45*  6.1  7.2  6.2  0.91  0.03 
     P-Value  0.000  0.007  0.012      0.000  0.846  0.000     
aAbsolute value of t-test. * Significant at 5%. 3/3/2005  40 
Table 8 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops  
by Categories of Capital Mobility 
 (5-year average for Capital Mobility Index) 
  Current Account Reversals  Sudden Stops 
  High  Int.  Low  t-test
a  High  Int.  Low  t-test
a 
        H=I  H=L        H=I  H=L 
Industrial  1.0  3.4  18.8  1.91  6.86*  2.4  5.8  12.5  1.89  3.19* 
Latin America  14.9  16.0  14.8  0.32  0.03  7.7  7.9  7.7  0.06  0.01 
Asia  15.3  21.5  5.6  1.17  2.96*  11.9  6.7  0.6  1.23  4.51* 
Africa  12.8  19.4  15.0  1.49  0.54  5.6  8.1  5.6  0.79  0.00 
Middle east  15.1  8.5  22.8  1.19  1.16  12.7  8.5  12.5  0.77  0.03 
Eastern Europe  10.0  18.8  0.0  0.58  1.65  20.0  6.3  3.7  1.05  1.63 
                     
Total  8.7  15.9  13.1  4.82*  3.07*  6.2  7.6  5.7  1.18  0.43 
     P-Value  0.000  0.001  0.001      0.000  0.972  0.003     
aAbsolute value of t-test. * Significant at 5%. 
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Table 9 
Banking Crises and Current Account Reversals 
 
  Total Sample  High Mobility 
  Banking Crisis  Banking Crisis 
Reversal  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  2443  118  2561  956  59  1015 
  95.4  4.6  100.0  94.2  5.8  100.0 
  87.1  86.1  87.0  90.7  92.2  90.8 
1  363  19  382  98  5  103 
  95.0  5.0  100.0  95.2  4.9  100.0 
  12.9  13.9  13.0  9.3  7.8  9.2 
Total  2806  137  2943  1054  64  1118 
  95.3  4.7  100.0  94.3  5.7  100.0 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Pearson c
2(1)    0.10    0.16      
P-value  0.75    0.91   
 
 
  Intermediate Mobility  Low Mobility 
  Banking Crisis  Banking Crisis 
Reversal  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  608  22  630  879  37  916 
  96.5  3.5  100.0  96.0  4.0  100.0 
  83.0  75.9  82.7  86.3  84.1  86.2 
1  125  7  132  140  7  147 
  94.7  5.3  100.0  95.2  4.8  100.0 
  17.1  24.1  17.3  13.7  15.9  13.8 
Total  733  29  762  1019  44  1063 
  96.2  3.8  100.0  95.9  4.1  100.0 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Pearson c
2(1)    0.98    0.17      
P-value  0.32    0.68   
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Table 10 
Banking Crises and Sudden Stops 
 
  Total Sample  High Mobility 
  Banking Crisis  Banking Crisis 
Sudden Stop  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  2587  128  2715  980  59  1039 
  95.3  4.7  100.0  94.3  5.7  100.0 
  93.4  93.4  93.4  93.6  92.2  93.5 
1  182  9  191  67  5  72 
  95.3  4.7  100.0  93.1  6.9  100.0 
  6.6  6.6  6.6  6.4  7.8  6.5 
Total  2769  137  2906  1047  64  1111 
  95.3  4.7  100.0  94.2  5.8  100.0 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Pearson c
2(1)    0.00    0.20   
P-value  0.99    0.66   
 
 
  Intermediate Mobility  Low Mobility 
  Banking Crisis  Banking Crisis 
Sudden Stop  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
0  688  28  716  919  41  960 
  96.1  3.9  100.0  95.7  4.3  100.0 
  92.7  96.6  92.9  93.8  93.2  93.8 
1  54  1  55  61  3  64 
  98.2  1.8  100.0  95.3  4.7  100.0 
  7.3  3.5  7.1  6.2  6.8  6.3 
Total  742  29  771  980  44  1024 
  96.2  3.8  100.0  95.7  4.3  100.0 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Pearson c
2(1)    0.62    0.03      
P-value  0.43    0.87   
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Table 11 
Before and After GDP per capita Growth 
 












   
  Panel A 
























   
  Panel B 
























             
The “before” data corresponds to average GDP per capita growth during the three years before the crisis. In 
Panel A “after” rates of growth is for year of the crisis. In Panel B “after” is average growth rate during 
three years after the crisis.    
aAbsolute value of t-test. * Significant at 5%. 
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Table 12 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth  
(GLS Estimates) 












              Constant  -0.15  -0.14  -0.27  -0.25  -0.14  -0.10 
  (1.16)  (1.41)  (2.62)*  (2.44)**  (1.32)  (0.97) 
Growth gap  0.82  0.86  0.81  0.87  0.82  0.88 
  (42.10)*  (42.73)*  (40.18)*  (41.62)*  (40.76)*  (42.28)* 
Change in terms of trade  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.08 
  (12.65)*  (12.19)*  (11.31)*  (10.74)*  (12.18)*  (11.75)* 
Reversal  -2.01  -2.10  --  --  -1.80  -1.97 
  (6.64)*  (6.72)*  --  --  (5.50)*  (5.82)* 
Sudden Stop  --  --  -1.23  -1.25  -0.54  -0.60 
  --  --  (2.82)*  (2.77)*  (1.19)  (1.31) 
             
Observations  1821  1821  1641  1641  1635  1635 
Countries  90  90  81  81  81  81 
R-squared  0.49  0.49  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.52 
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies are included, 
but not reported; *significant at 1%, **significant at 5%.  
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Table 13 
Growth, Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops: Treatment Effects Model  
(Three Steps Estimates) 
Variable  (13.1)  (13.2)  (13.3) 
A. Results from Growth Equation       
Growth gap  0.87  0.87  0.86 
  (32.63)*  (32.66)*  (25.76)* 
Terms of trade  0.07  0.07  0.07 
  (8.48)*  (8.43)*  (6.47)* 
Reversal  -5.35  -3.93  -6.72 
  (4.83)*  (2.86)*  (3.69)* 
Reversal*Openness  0.02  0.02  0.01 
  (2.22)**  (2.38)**  (0.97) 
Reversal* Capital Mobility  --  -0.03***  -0.005 
  --  (1.70)  (0.19) 
       
B. Results from “Treatment Equation”       
Capital mobility (-1)  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008 
  (1.47)  (1.48)  (1.56) 
Current-Account deficit to GDP (-1)  0.10  0.10  0.11 
  (8.16)*  (8.16)*  (5.93)** 
Sudden stop   0.67  0.67  0.63 
  (3.09)*  (3.08)*  (2.26)** 
Sudden stops in region   1.34  1.34  1.09 
  (2.08)**  (2.08)**  (1.43) 
Reserves to GDP (-1)  -16.95  -16.85  -5.47 
  (1.87)***  (1.86)***  (0.40) 
Domestic credit growth (-1)  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
  (1.33)  (1.33)  (1.12) 
Banking crisis   0.19  0.18  0.16 
  (0.79)  (0.76)  (0.63) 
External debt to GDP (-1)  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  (2.11)**  (2.11)**  (1.47) 
Short-term debt (-1)  -0.007  -0.007  -0.0001 
  (0.75)  (0.77)  (0.00) 
Debt services (-1)  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.18) 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.01  -0.01  -0.81 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (2.97)* 
Dollarization   --  --  0.24 
  --  --  (5.14)* 
Hazard lambda  1.18  1.23  1.85 
  (2.45)**  (2.56)**  (2.85)* 
       
Rho  0.29  0.30  0.45 
Sigma  4.11  4.11  4.11 
Wald chi2 (215)  1190.70  1190.74  786.2 
Observations  1071  1069  647 
  Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses; (-1) denotes a one-period lagged variable; 
  country-specific dummies are included, but not reported.  
  * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%; 3/3/2005  46 
Table 14 
Determinants of Current Account Reversals: IV Probit Model  
 
Variable  (14a)  (14b) 
     
Capital mobility (-1)  -0.004  -0.002 
  (0.42)  (0.19) 
Current-Account deficit to GDP (-1)  0.064  0.065 
  (8.06)*  (8.33)* 
Sudden stop   0.868  0.861 
  (4.74)*  (4.79)* 
Sudden stops in region   1.761  1.771 
  (3.13)*  (3.25)* 
Reserves to GDP (-1)  -2.935  -4.437 
  (0.56)  (0.84) 
Domestic credit growth (-1)  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.66)  (0.60) 
External debt to GDP (-1)  0.001  0.001 
  (1.10)  (0.93) 
Short-term debt (-1)  0.002  0.004 
  (0.39)  (0.84) 
Debt services (-1)  -0.008  -0.007 
  (1.46)  (1.29) 
Initial GDP per capita  0.094  0.065 
  (0.86)  (0.58) 
     
Observations  1071  1071 
  Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses; (-1) denotes a one-period  
lagged variable; country-specific dummies are included, but not reported.  For a list of the 
instruments used, see the test. 
  * significant at 1%.  3/3/2005  47 
Appendix 
Description of the Data 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
     
Index of capital 
mobility 
Index: (low mobility) to 100 (high 
mobility) 
Author’s construction based on 
indexes of capital restrictions 
computed by Quinn (2003) and 
Mody and Murshid (2002), and 
on country specific data 
     
Current-Account  
Reversal 
Reduction in the current account 
deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one 
year. Initial balance has to be indeed a 
deficit 
Author’s construction based on 
data of current account deficit 
(World Development Indicators) 
     
Sudden Stop  Reduction of net capital inflows of at 
least 5% of GDP in one year. The 
country in question must have 
received an inflow of capital larger to 
its region’s third quartile during the 
previous two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”   
Author’s construction based on 
data of financial account (World 
Development Indicators) 
     
Banking crisis   Dummy variable for occurrence of a 
banking crisis 
Glick and Hutchison (1999) 
     
Dollarization  Index: 0 (low dollarization) to 30 
(high dollarization) 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 
(2003) 
     
Terms of trade  Change in terms of trade-exports as 
capacity to import (constant LCU) 
World Development Indicators 
     
Openness  Trade openness: exports plus imports 
over GDP 
World Development Indicators 
     
Reserves to GDP   Net international reserves over GDP  World Development Indicators 
     
Domestic credit 
growth  
Annual growth rate of domestic credit  World Development Indicators 
     
External debt to 
GDP 
Total external debt over GDP  World Development Indicators 
     
Short-term debt   Short-term debt as percentage of total 
external debt  
World Development Indicators 
     
Debt services  Total debt services as percentage of 
exports of goods and services 
World Development Indicators 
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